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HELPING STUDENTS WHO CAN'T HELP 
THEMSELVES: SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD FOR TITLE 
IX PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has long held that students do not 
"shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate." 1 
Although that infamous case of the black armbands2 was 
referencing student freedom of speech, the same could be said 
for other student rights, including the right to be free from 
sexual harassment in the school environment. The courts have 
struggled long and hard over how to classify the public school 
arena for a variety of constitutional issues, and have settled on 
the idea that it is a unique environment with its own set of 
rights and duties, and its own species of litigation therein. 
Among those rights and duties are special duties held by school 
officials and administrators. In exploring the extent of 
students' Fourth Amendment constitutional rights, the 
Supreme Court in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
emphasized that the State's power over schoolchildren is 
"custodial and tutelary."3 Then, in T.L.O. v. New Jersey, the 
Court went on to say this power requires "close supervision of 
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against 
conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by 
an adult."4 
When these "custodial and tutelary" powers are coupled 
with the gravity of compulsory attendance laws, the role of 
school administrators and officials takes on added weight. 
Mandatory education for all children is established through the 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines, :393 U.S. 508, 506 (1968). 
2. ld. at 503 (discussing the case of students who wore black armbands on their 
sleeves to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam War). 
3. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 616, 655 (1995). 
4. T.L.O. v. New .Jersey, 169 U.S. 325, :389 (1985). 
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common law doctrine of parens patriae, which holds that the 
state, through its police power, has the "inherent prerogative to 
provide for the commonwealth and individual welfare."5 
Intrinsic to this duty is the role of the guardian, with the 
authority to "protect those who are not legally competent to act 
in their own behalf."6 Additionally, the common law doctrine of 
in loco parentis vests school administrators and teachers with 
"the responsibility of protecting the interests of the child in the 
school environment."7 In sum, there exists the expectation that 
the school, and those who operate the school, will take care for 
the well-being of each student. 
Viewing this concept in the light of peer sexual harassment, 
it seems the school has a special duty to ensure a student's 
educational opportunities are not hindered by the threat of 
unwelcome sexual encounters. The Supreme Court addressed 
this duty for the first time in 1999 in Davis v. Monroe. 8 
Although the Davis ruling still stands as good law today, it 
does not specifically address the special education sector of the 
student population at large. What about the class of students 
who arguably need extra protection beyond that of their peers? 
Additionally, what about the class of students who just cannot 
seem to control their impulses and have a higher propensity for 
inappropriate peer relations due to their disability? Compared 
to their peers, students with disabilities run a higher risk of 
being either the target or the perpetrator of peer sexual 
harassment.9 This propensity may be attributed to their 
"difficulties [in] using appropriate social skills and their lack of 
insight regarding how their behavior affects interpersonal 
relationships." 10 
This article will outline the challenges that schools, and 
their officials, face in providing a safe environment for all 
students, and specifically for students with disabilities. This 
5. KEHN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMEIUCAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 
301 (6th ed. 2005). 
6. !d. at :-l01. 
7. !d. at 501. 
8. Davis v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
9. Ellie L. Young et a!., Sexual Harassment among Students with Educational 
Disabilities: Perspectives of Special Educators, 29 REM";DJAL & SPECIAL Enuc. 208, 208 
(Aug. 2008) (citing A.K. Kavale & S. Forness, Social Shills Deficits and Learnin~t 
Disabilities: A Meta-Analysis, 29 ,J. LEARNING DISABILI'I'IES 226--il7 (1996)). 
10. /d. at 208 (citing K. L. LAm; ET AL., [NTEIWENTIONS FOR CHILDllEN WITH OR AT 
RISK FOR EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL D!SOIWERS 212-58 (2002)). 
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article will begin by outlining the most recent circuit court 
decision that follows the Davis v. Monroe framework, Patterson 
v. Hudson Area Schools, and will demonstrate how the Sixth 
Circuit has chosen to apply Davis to this area of the law. Then 
the article will address, in turn, the implications of special 
education students as targets of peer sexual harassment, 
special education students as perpetrators of peer sexual 
harassment, and situations identifying both the target and the 
perpetrator as students with disabilities. Furthermore, this 
article seeks to identify when the school will be held liable in 
cases of student-on-student sexual harassment, and where 
various courts have drawn the line with respect to the 
"deliberate indifference" standard for school liability. Lastly the 
article will address where the Davis standard lies today with 
regards to same-sex student-on-student sexual harassment. 
II. THE STORY OF A BOY NAMED DP 
Everyone knows that the middle and high school years can 
be rough; adolescence is not a walk in the park. But for a boy 
named DP, those years were perhaps the worst of his life. It all 
began in 2002 when DP was a sixth-grade student attending 
Hudson Area Schools (hereinafter "Hudson"). It started with 
peers of DP calling him names, and pushing and shoving him 
in the hallways. The name-calling was mostly sexual in nature, 
with labels such as "queer" and "faggot" used on almost a daily 
basis. When DP reported some of these instances, he was told 
"kids will be kids, it's middle school." 11 As a result of this 
harassment, DP became anxious, distraught and angry, and 
started receiving psychological treatment. 12 In seventh grade 
the harassment of DP only escalated: along with "queer" and 
"faggot," other words such as "man boobs" and "gay" were used 
on a daily basis, more than 200 times during this school year. 13 
Additionally, the term "Mr. Clean" was used by his peers to 
reference DP's supposed lack of pubic hair. 14 Naturally, DP 
wanted to quit school not far into his seventh grade year. At 
this point, the school principal offered to mentor DP; however, 
11. Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 138, 439 (6th Cir. 2009). 
12. !d. at 1<10. 
1:3. !d. 
14. !d. 
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these visits were short-lived as they coincided with the visits of 
problem students at the end of each day and DP feared he 
would be labeled a "trouble kid" by his peers. 15 DP continued to 
withdraw socially, eating lunch by himself in the band room to 
avoid his peers. 16 
DP's parents (hereinafter "the Pattersons") repeatedly 
reported these incidences, as well as their concerns, to school 
administrators, counselors, and teachers at various conferences 
starting in the sixth grade. 17 In December of DP's seventh 
grade year, the Pattersons met with the principal and 
discussed DP's suffering grades, as well as DP's desire to not 
return to school. 18 As the year went on, the Pattersons 
continued to meet with school administration where school 
staff repeatedly told the Pattersons that DP was doing nothing 
wrong to merit this type of harassment from his peers. 19 
After seventh grade, the school counselor had DP evaluated 
for special education services, which established that DP was 
emotionally impaired, qualifying him for services under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter 
"IDEA").20 As such, during his eighth grade year, DP was 
assigned to receive help from a resource teacher for one period 
each day. 21 The resource teacher was especially effective in 
teaching DP to cope with his peers and as a result, DP had a 
successful eighth grade year.22 However, because the resource 
teacher was specifically for middle school students, when DP 
began high school the following year, he was no longer able to 
receive mentorship from the resource teacher.23 Although the 
middle school resource room was housed in the same building 
as the high school, the principal denied specific requests by the 
Pattersons for DP to continue meeting with the resource 
teacher, and DP did not receive any new or additional resource 
room support during his ninth grade year.24 
15. I d. 
16. !d. 
17. I d. 
18. ld. at 141. 
19. !d. 
20. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1150 (2005). 
21. Patterson, 551 F.ild at 111. 
22. I d. 
23. /d. 
24. !d. 
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Ninth grade brought back all of the same problems that DP 
experienced during his sixth and seventh grade years, 
including pushing, shoving and name-calling with words such 
as "faggot," "queer," and again, "Mr. Clean."25 After reporting 
those incidences, those particular name-calling students did 
not bother DP again; however, other students found new ways 
to harass DP. A fellow student wrote "[DP] is a fag" on the back 
of DP's presentations note cards so that the entire class could 
read it.26 Another student defaced DP's planner with phrases 
such as "I like it in the Ass," "I [heart] penis," "I'm a mamma's 
boy/1 suck on her nipple" and drawings of buttocks and a 
penis. 27 Additionally, students hung a "Mr. Clean" poster on 
DP's locker.n All students involved in these incidences received 
only a verbal reprimand by either the school counselor or 
principal, with the exception of one student who was suspended 
for one day, as he had previously violated an unrelated school 
rule. 29 All students involved never bothered DP again to the 
knowledge of school administration.30 
However, there continued to be incidences of harassment 
where the school could not identify the student perpetrator. A 
student broke into DP's gym locker, threw his shoes in the 
toilet, urinated on his clothes, and used shaving cream to spell 
out sexually oriented words on the locker.31 A few months later, 
unknown students vandalized DP's locker on both the inside 
and outside with words such as "faggot," "gay," "queer," "suck 
your mother's tits," and "you suck clicks," illustrated by 
pictures of a penis being inserted into a rectum. 32 Although 
Hudson reports conducting an investigation, it never identified 
or held any student responsible for these acts.33 
In May of his ninth grade year, DP was the victim of sexual 
assault when a fellow teammate took off his clothes and 
cornered DP in the locker room after baseball practice.34 This 
25. !d. at 4-12. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. 
::Jo. /d. 
;:)1. !d. 
:12. /d. 
:3:1. /d. 
:H. /d. 
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teammate rubbed his genitals on DP's neck and face while 
another teammate blocked the exit to the locker room, 
preventing DP's escape.35 The Pattersons informed the 
principal of this incident the next day during a double-header 
baseball game, in which both DP and the perpetrator were 
participating.36 The following Monday Hudson began 
investigating the incident, and the student perpetrator was 
suspended for the eight remaining days of the school year. 37 A 
few weeks later this student perpetrator was charged with 
assault with the intent to commit a felony and criminal sexual 
conduct in the second degree.38 Eventually this student was 
expelled from Hudson after pleading guilty to disorderly 
conduct. 39 The second student, who blocked the exit during the 
incident, received only a verbal reprimand.40 
The outrageous nature of this incident did not stop with the 
actions of the student athlete. Although Hudson took action by 
suspending the student perpetrator, the school still allowed 
this student to participate in the end-of-year sports banquet, 
held one week after the incident.41 Even more alarming were 
the actions of the baseball team coach who, after hearing word 
of the incident, held a baseball team meeting where he told his 
players, in the presence of DP, to "not joke around with guys 
who can't take a man joke."42 As a result of all this harassment, 
DP was psychologically unable to return to the Hudson 
campus, and so for his tenth grade year DP received 
instructional services from Hudson via the campus of a nearby 
Catholic elementary school.43 Although teachers visited DP 
occasionally, they were largely unavailable and as a result, DP 
was not academically successful that year.44 Eventually DP 
was able to take classes at the local college, facilitating his 
early graduation.45 
35. !d. 
36. !d. 
37. !d. at 413. 
38. !d. 
39. !d. 
40. !d. 
11. I d. 
42. !d. 
43. !d. 
41. I d. 
45. !d. 
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After years of harassment by his peers, DP's parents filed 
suit under Title IX, claiming that Hudson Area Schools 
violated Title IX by allowing their son to be harassed. After the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school 
district, the Pattersons appealed.46 The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the school district was deliberately indifferent to 
student-on-student sexual harassment, and so the case was 
reversed and remanded. The Hudson Area School District 
petitioned for a rehearing as well as a rehearing en bane, but 
both were denied on May 1, 2009.47 Certiorari was also denied 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in October 2009. 
III. ONE MORE LOOK AT THE FACTS 
If the facts are taken as true, DP had any number of 
horrific experiences created by his ruthless and unfeeling 
peers. But were the school staff and administration ruthless 
and unfeeling as well? Is it fair to say the school should be held 
accountable for failing to prevent every incident of student-on-
student peer harassment? One more look at the facts 
surrounding this case may reveal a different side. 
The busy principal was encumbered by delinquent students 
and endless discipline tasks inherent to a public middle school, 
yet he volunteered to take time each day to mentor DP. Should 
the principal be labeled as "indifferent" when he was absent 
from his office on some of the days DP came to meet with him? 
Was he "deliberate" when he asked to see DP at the end of the 
day when he also happened to check in with problem 
students?48 It was DP's choice to stop meeting with the 
principal, not the unavailability of the principal, which ended 
these mentoring sessions.49 
Not all the incidents involving DP were reported, but each 
time an incident was reported, the school took action when an 
individual offender could be identified. Although many times 
the offending student received only a verbal reprimand, this 
form of disciplinary action was effective in the sense that there 
46. /d. at 1:l8. 
17. !d. 
18. !d. at 110. 
49. /d. at 15:l (Vinson, .J., dissenting). 
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were never repeat offenders. 50 In the case of other reported 
incidences, DP could not furnish a name of the offending 
student, nor could the school discover who it was, despite their 
investigations. To what lengths should a school go in order to 
discipline one student and to deter all other students from 
engaging in the same misconduct? 
In an effort to educate students about peer harassment and 
bullying, Hudson implemented programs such as "Bang, Bang, 
You're Dead" and "Flirting and Hurting."51 The Pattersons 
brought evidence that these types of programs were not 
effective, nor were they always taught to every single student. 
The dissenting opinion, however, points out that the school did 
have policies and procedures for harassment in place, and the 
failure to make every single student understand their 
significance was more of a negligence argument rather than 
deliberate indifference on the part of the school. 52 
The school counselor regularly invited DP to attend both 
individual and group counseling sessions for students 
experiencing peer relationship struggles. DP also received 
preferential classroom seating, extra time to take tests, and 
counseling sessions with a social worker.53 Over the summer, 
when most school staff was on vacation, the school psychologist 
and social worker evaluated DP and assisted him in qualifying 
for special services, including an Individualized Education Plan 
(hereinafter "IEP").54 This allowed DP to become eligible for 
supporting services, including access to a resource teacher. 55 
The resource teacher who acted as a mentor for DP during 
his eighth grade year was actually the science teacher, and the 
resource room was nothing more than a study hall for DP. 56 It 
was not the access to a resource room or program, but rather it 
was the mentor relationship of the science teacher that allowed 
50. ld. at 442 (majority opinion) (stating an account of all incidences of 
harassment experienced by DP where when offending student was identified and 
disciplined, the record states that so and so "never bothered Dl' again"). 
51. ld. at 450 n.lO. 
52. Id. at 454-55 (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at 453. 
54. ld. at 441 (majority opinion). 
55. Jd. 
56. Jd. at 454 n.6 (Vinson, J., dissenting) (DP himself testified that the "resource 
room" was actually a study hall, where he would do his homework. When qtwstioned 
about what actually caused the positive turnaround during his eighth grade year, DP 
said "I have no clue."). 
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DP to have a successful school year. When DP matriculated to 
ninth grade, this science teacher generously offered to continue 
to mentor DP for 25 to 30 minutes each week and the principal 
consented to this opportunity.57 Should the high school be held 
liable for not providing DP with another study hall and adult 
mentor? 
The locker room incident from DP's ninth grade year 
resulted in the permanent expulsion of the offender from 
Hudson schools and criminal prosecution. Mter his tenth grade 
year, DP had the opportunity to take college courses, paid for 
entirely by Hudson, allowing him to take advanced classes, 
become fluent in Japanese, and graduate from high school 
early with As and Bs. 58 Although his education took on a 
nontraditional form, DP was not denied access to educational 
opportunities despite the harassment by other students. 
Instead, the school provided a creative solution that allowed 
DP to successfully finish high school. 
IV. TITLE IX: THE PATTERSONS' CLAIM AGAINST HUDSON AREA 
SCHOOLS 
The Pattersons' complaint against Hudson alleged that 
Hudson violated DP's equal protection rights as well as Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972.59 Additionally, the 
Pattersons filed suit against the superintendent of Hudson, 
claiming that she failed to properly train staff regarding 
harassment issues and ensure compliance with federal law and 
Hudson policies.60 In analyzing the Title IX claim, the district 
court relied on the three-part test from Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Hudson. The court determined specifically that the third 
prong "deliberate indifference" standard of the Davis three-part 
test was unmet, as the Pattersons' failed to show how Hudson's 
response was "clearly unreasonable in light of known 
circumstances."61 As for the other two prongs of the Davis test, 
57. ld. at 151. 
58. I d. at 15il. 
59. Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005). 
60. Patterson, 551 F.ild at 11:3 (majority opinion). 
61. /d. at 411 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Ed. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 
(1999)). 
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it is undisputed that the Pattersons met the burdens for those 
requirements.62 
On appeal, the Pattersons' only claim was that the district 
court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, Hudson 
was not deliberately indifferent and thereby did not violate 
Title IX. As such, the Sixth Circuit Court focused entirely on 
the Title IX claim against Hudson, and did not consider the 
alleged violation of equal protection, or the case against 
Hudson's superintendent as Title IX holds no individual 
liability claim.63 The Sixth Circuit undertook a de novo review, 
analyzing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, the Pattersons. 64 Mter a thorough analysis of 
the facts of the case, the Sixth Circuit majority concluded that 
the Pattersons did indeed demonstrate a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether Hudson's actions were 
deliberately indifferent and the case was reversed and 
remanded. 65 To reach this decision, the court relied heavily on 
its own reasoning from a prior Title IX Sixth Circuit case, 
Vance v. Spencer County Public School District.66 The Vance 
court, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court decision in Davis to 
arrive at its conclusion that a school board was deliberately 
indifferent to the sexual harassment of a female high school 
student by other students and therefore liable under Title IX.67 
V. THE DAVIS THREE-PART TEST FOR DETERMINING TITLE IX 
LIABILITY 
In 1999, the Supreme Court ruled in Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education that Title IX may support a private 
cause of action against a recipient of federal funds where there 
exists a claim for student-on-student sexual harassment.68 In 
order to establish the prima facie case for this claim, the 
62. !d. at 150 (where the other two prongs of the Davis Test require the plaintiff 
to establish that (1) the sexual harassment was so severe that it could he said to 
deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities, and (2) the funding 
recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment). 
63. Id. at 414. 
64. Id. at 441 (relying on Nat'] Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 111 F.:ld 561, 56:i (6th Cir. 
1991) for the standard of review). 
65. /d. at 446. 
66. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 2:31 F.:ld 25:l (6th Cir. 2000). 
67. Id. 
68. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 6:l:l (1999). 
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plaintiff must establish that (1) the sexual harassment was so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said 
to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits provided by the school, (2) the funding 
recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, and 
(3) the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the 
harassment.69 Eleven years later, the Davis decision still 
stands as the prcccdcntial case defining student-on-student 
sexual harassment in the school environment. 
The Davis decision came about from a situation where a 
fifth-grade girl had been the victim of sexual harassment by 
another student who made vulgar comments such as "I want to 
get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs," as well as 
attempts to touch the girl's breasts and genital area. 70 
Although the victim reported each incident to her teacher and 
her mother, and the teacher assured the mother that the 
principal was aware, this harassment continued for several 
months and the offender went undisciplined. 71 It was also 
reported that a number of other girls in the same fifth-grade 
class tried to report similar complaints to the principal, but the 
teacher denied their request, stating, "If [the principal] wants 
you, he'll call you.'m For five months this behavior continued 
until finally the offending student pled guilty to sexual 
misconduct. The damage to the victim, however, had already 
been done, as her previously high grades dropped, her level of 
distractedness in school rose, and her father even found a 
suicide note that she wrote. 73 The court concluded that the 
school district's lack of response suggested "deliberate 
indifference" where (1) the principal failed to discipline the 
student beyond stating "I guess I'll have to threaten him a little 
bit harder," (2) the teacher made no effort to separate the 
plaintiff from the student when their classroom seats were 
adjacent, and (3) the Monroe County Board of Education had 
yet to instruct its personnel on how to respond to peer sexual 
harassment, nor had it developed policy on the matter. 74 
69. Id. at 629, 633. 
70. /d. at 6:l3. 
71. /d. at 634. 
72. /d. at 6:35. 
7:3. /d. at 6:H. 
74. !d. at 634-:l5. 
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As student-on-student harassment under Title IX had not 
been addressed previously, the Davis court borrowed heavily 
from language found in Title VII to conclude that: 
[A]s Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a 
sexually hostile environment created by co-workers and 
tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for 
damages due to a sexually hostile educational environment 
created by a fellow student or students when the supervising 
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the 
harassment. 75 
The Davis Court also looked to a handbook issued by the 
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights for guidance 
on what a school district's appropriate response should be for 
student-on-student harassment. 76 The handbook stressed that 
a school should "take immediate and appropriate steps to 
investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take 
steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a 
hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent 
harassment from occurring again."77 
The final standard on deliberate indifference to come out of 
Davis is still used by courts today, and holds that a federal 
funds recipient (public school) is deliberately indifferent where 
"recipient's response to the harassment or lack thereof is 
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances."n 
This does not mean a school must "'remedy' peer harassment, 
and [] 'ensur[e] that ... students conform their conduct to' 
certain rules. Title IX imposes no such requirements. On the 
contrary, the recipient must merely respond to known peer 
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."79 
The phrase "not clearly unreasonable" is the prong where 
circuit courts, as well as district courts, have split. Exactly 
what type of conduct ensures that a school district's response to 
student-on-student harassment is "not clearly unreasonable" is 
still up for debate. However, the Davis majority opinion was 
clear to stress that avoiding liability is not accomplished "only 
75. ld. at 636. 
76. Davis at 526 U.S. at 618 (citing Dep't of Educ., Office for Civ. Rts .• Sexual 
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, 
or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12031, 12039-12010 (Mar. 1:J, 1997)). 
77. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.:ld 253, 261 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000). 
78. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-19 (citations omitted). 
79. ld. at 648-49. 
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by purging their schools of actionable peer harassment." Nor 
does it mean that "administrators must engage in particular 
disciplinary action," where victims of peer harassment would 
make "particular remedial demands."80 In fact, the majority 
opinion went on to articulate that "courts should refrain from 
second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school 
administrators."81 
VI. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT STRETCHING VANCE TOO FAR: HOW 
PATTERSON RATCHETS UP THE LEVEL OF SCHOOL 
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF PREVENTING ALL 
FUTURE PEER HARASSMENT 
Vance, like Davis, involved a case of student-on-student 
harassment where the parents claimed, and the Sixth Circuit 
Court agreed, that the school acted deliberately indifferent. 82 
In Vance, a high school female was repeatedly harassed by the 
same male classmates, including lewd name-calling, shoving, 
and propositioning, culminating in an episode of sexual assault 
in the classroom where two boys held her down, pulled her 
hair, and tried to take off her shirt while another boy took off 
his pants. 83 Although the female student's mother wrote a 
letter to the principal detailing this incident, the boys were 
never disciplined, nor were law enforcement officials involved. 
The court found the school deliberately indifferent. 84 
The defendant school in Vance tried to argue that the Davis 
standard meant that as long as the school did something in 
response to harassment complaint, it had satisfied the Davis 
standard and was not deliberately indifferent. The court in 
Vance did not accept this argument. Rather, the court in Vance 
responded with this statement: 
Such minimalist response is not within the contemplation of a 
reasonable response. Although no particular response is 
required, and although the school district is not required to 
eradicate all sexual harassment, the school district must 
respond and must do so reasonably in light of the known 
circumstances. Thus, where a school district has knowledge 
80. !d. at 618. 
81. !d. (citing T.L.O. v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. :325, 342 n.9 (1985)). 
82. Vance, 2:11 F.ild at 25:3. 
8:~. !d. at 256. 
81. !d. 
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that its remedial action is inadequate and ineffective, it is 
required to take reasonable action in light of those 
circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school 
district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are 
ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no 
avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the 
known circumstances. 85 
In Patterson, the Sixth Circuit majority viewed the prior 
Vance fact pattern as analogous to the case at hand: both cases 
involved a student being harassed by peers over an extended 
period of time. Both cases involved an escalating event of 
sexual assault by other students. In both cases the Sixth 
Circuit determined that Davis's third prong of "deliberate 
indifference" was met where the school's lack of response to the 
harassment was "clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances."86 
However, what the Patterson court fails to take into account 
are the significant differences between the facts of the 
Patterson case and the facts of the Vance case. In Vance, 
whenever the female student would complain of being 
harassed, the administration either did nothing, or only 
verbally reprimanded the offending classmates, which led to an 
escalation of the harassment. The disciplinary action was not 
effective, and the same classmates were repeat offenders. In 
Patterson, each time the administration gave a verbal 
reprimand to a harassing student, that student never bothered 
DP again. In Vance, when the female student was sexually 
assaulted by the group of males, the school did not take any 
disciplinary action, did not launch an investigation, did not 
involve law enforcement officials, and did not offer the female 
student a change of classroom, even when the mother filed a 
report with the district's Title IX coordinator. 87 In Patterson, 
when the locker room sexual assault incident occurred, the 
school launched an investigation, expelled the offender 
permanently, and involved the law enforcement who charged 
the offender criminally.88 
How much should the courts require the schools to do 
before they are outside the zone of "deliberate indifference"? 
85. /d. at 260-61. 
86. ld. at 260. 
87. ld. at 253. 
88. Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.:id <1:38, 11il (2009). 
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The Vance court clearly articulates that "[t]he recipient is not 
required to 'remedy' sexual harassment nor ensure that 
students conform their conduct to certain rules, but rather, 'the 
recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a 
manner that is not clearly unreasonable."'89 The court goes on 
to articulate that a victim in these circumstances does not have 
"a right to particular remedial demands" and that "courts 
should not second guess the disciplinary decisions that school 
administrators make."90 
If the Patterson decision stands, the courts might ratchet up 
the level of school vigilance and responsiveness so high, that 
schools will be asked to do the impossible task of remedying all 
future harassment, as well as purging schools of all current 
peer harassment. The court in Vance was correct to 
acknowledge that if a school just does something, they still 
might not be entirely off the hook. However, the Patterson 
court has taken this one step too far by second-guessing the 
school authorities' responses to dealing with student-on-
student harassment. 
VII. THE DAVIS STANDARD APPLIED TO THE SPECIAL 
EDUCATION SECTOR 
Although none of the players in the Davis case were special 
education students, many of the cases that follow Davis involve 
special education students, and in particular, mentally or 
physically disabled students. The world of special education 
adds a whole new set of rules, statutes, due process 
considerations, and policies that further complicate incidents of 
student-on-student sexual harassment. When peer harassment 
occurs, the Davis standard calls for actions by schools that are 
"not clearly unreasonable" in light of the known 
circumstances.91 But it remains unclear what qualifies as 
sufficient intervention when the students themselves are 
physically, emotionally, or mentally disabled. 
89. Vance, 2:31 F.:ld at 260 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 618-49). 
90. Patterson, 551 F.3d at 116 (citing Vance, 231 F.3d at 260). 
91. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). 
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A. Special Education Students as Targets of Peer Harassment 
In Patterson, the boy DP was classified as a special 
education student and given an IEP allowing him to access a 
resource room during his eighth grade year, which proved to be 
successful in combating the peer harassment. However, in 
ninth grade his IEP was modified and the principal "didn't 
think that [the high school resource room] was the place for 
[DP]."92 This was one of several factors considered by the Sixth 
Circuit in determining there was a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether Hudson's actions were deliberately 
indifferent. 93 
In another Sixth Circuit case, Soper v. Hoben, a parent filed 
a Title IX suit against a school district when her special 
education daughter, Renee, was raped by one of her 
classmates. However, the court dismissed the claim against the 
school district, finding the last two prongs of the Davis Test 
were unmet.94 Renee was a middle school student who had 
Down's Syndrome and was classified as an "educable mentally 
impaired" student (EMI). She was placed in a class with 
several other EMI students, including "Boy A," the boy who 
raped her. Prior to enrolling in this class, Renee's mother had 
informed the school and teacher of a prior kissing incident 
between Renee and Boy A, and the teacher reassured the 
mother that they would "keep an eye on the children," stating 
"[t]hey're well supervised."95 However, shortly into the school 
year, Renee was raped by Boy A after he told her to hide in the 
back room when the teacher was locking up. 96 Additionally, 
Renee was molested by two other male classmates. 97 
Upon hearing about the rape and molestation incidences, 
the school immediately launched an investigation, contacted 
Child Protective Services, and implemented a plan for 
increased supervision of Renee while in school.9~ Additionally 
the school installed windows in the special education classroom 
doors, placed aides in the class and on the school bus, and 
92. Patterson, 551 F.:3d at 411. 
9:3. ld. at 416. 
91. Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.:id 815 (6th Cir. 1999). 
95. Id. at 849. 
96. ld. 
97. Id. 
98. ld. 
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referred all three boys to counseling sessions.99 However, Boy A 
was not suspended until months later, when he was formally 
charged by law enforcement, and the two boys involved in the 
molestation incident were never disciplined by the school. 100 
Despite the dissatisfaction of Renee's mother with the school's 
response, the Sixth Circuit found that the "prompt and 
thorough response by school officials" was not "clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." 101 The 
court contrasted the quick actions of school officials in this case 
with Davis where the school failed to respond to complaints of 
peer sexual harassment for over five months. 102 
Alternatively, the dissenting opinion for Soper points out 
that the school did in fact have notice of a prior incident of 
harassment involving Renee and Boy A when Renee's mother 
reported the prior kissing incident and specifically requested 
that Renee and Boy A not be left alone together. 103 However, 
the school did not honor this request and although "assurances 
were given, no steps were actually taken to minimize or stop 
the harassment." 104 Rather, on the day of the rape, Boy A was 
allowed to accompany Renee alone to her locker. 105 Instead of 
incorporating the prior harassment incident into the 
"deliberate indifference" analysis, the court simply treated the 
rape incident as the first sign of "notice" and used that as the 
starting point to assess how quickly and effectively the school 
prevented a future recurrence of rape. However, if the court 
had expanded its analysis to include this prior incident, then 
"arguably, these actions amounted to deliberate 
indifference." 106 
What is interesting is how the Sixth Circuit distinguished 
this case from Vance, where the court stated: "Because of 
Spencer's deliberate indifference, it is readily distinguishable 
from Soper v. Hoben." 107 Soper was decided first, in 1999, just a 
few months after the Davis decision, and Vance was decided 
99. Jd. at 850. 
100. /d. at 850. 
101. !d. at 855. 
102. /d. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)). 
10:1. Jd. at 857 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
101. Jd. 
105. /d. at 819 (majority opinion). 
106. /d. at 857 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
107. Vancl' v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 2:31 F.3d 25:3, 262 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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one year later in November of 2000. The Sixth Circuit then 
looked back to Vance, not to Soper, in making its 2009 decision 
for Patterson v. Hudson Schools. 
Outside the Sixth Circuit, other courts are struggling with 
the same balancing act. Part of the debate within this Davis 
"deliberate indifference" standard lies in whether or not a 
school district is required to treat the continued harassment of 
one student as a systemic issue. If the standard calls for a 
systemic approach, then a school must effectively prevent the 
future harassment by any student perpetrator against the 
victim. The other view would be to hold a school district 
accountable only for the failure to stop continued harassment 
by a known perpetrator. 
In Doe v. Bellefonte Area School District, the Third Circuit 
held that the school district was not deliberately indifferent to 
known circumstances of student-on-student harassment where 
a student was harassed for three years by his peers for his 
"effeminate" characteristics. 108 Although this case does not 
involve a student with disabilities, it further clarifies that 
schools need not completely eradicate peer harassment before 
escaping liability, but instead must act in a "clearly 
reasonable" manner. The student's parents filed suit against 
the school district under Title IX, believing that the school was 
"deliberately indifferent" because their "method of dealing with 
specific, identified perpetrators was not 100% effective in 
stemming the harassment."109 The parents suggested that the 
school should have treated the ongoing harassment as a 
"systemic problem." The court, however, relied on language 
from Davis to make its decision and recognized that the school 
was quick to respond with "reasonable actions which 
eliminated further harassment between Doe and the student(s) 
involved in each incident." 110 The school took further steps to 
respond by warning, counseling, and even suspending the 
offending students, holding assemblies to educate the student 
body, and circulating memoranda to faculty and staff putting 
them on notice of the reported harassment of Doe. 111 The court 
held that the school district was not deliberately indifferent 
108. Doe v. Bellafonte Area Sch. Dist., No. 03-1210, 106 Fed. App'x. 798 Uld Cir. 
Aug. 1, 2004). 
109. ld. at 799. 
110. ld. at 800. 
111. ld. 
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despite the fact that it "did not undertake the specific remedial 
action that Doe desired," but rather, insisted that the court 
"refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary actions made by 
the School District which effectively eliminated each reported 
source of harassment." 112 
A similar case to Soper v. Hoben from the Sixth Circuit, but 
with a different outcome, was brought to the Tenth Circuit in 
Murrell u. School District No. 1, where the court found that the 
school district was liable under a Title IX claim. In this case 
the school principal and teachers had knowledge of the sexual 
harassment and assault of a student, who was a 
developmentally and physically disabled student, but chose to 
turn a blind eye. 113 
Penelope Jones was both physically disabled, due to 
cerebral palsy and deafness in one ear, and also 
developmentally disabled, functioning intellectually at the level 
of a first-grader, although she was a high school student. 114 
When she enrolled in high school, her mother informed her 
teachers as well as school administrators that Penelope had 
been sexually assaulted at her previous school and "expressed 
her fear that her daughter's mental and physical disabilities 
would place her at continued risk." 115 The school assured 
Penelope's mother that she would be "properly supervised,"116 
but did not inform her mother of several instances where a 
developmentally delayed male student harassed and sexually 
assaulted Penelope. It was not until Penelope starting 
engaging in suicidal behavior and entered a psychiatric 
hospital that her mother was informed of the sexual assault 
incidents. 117 Additionally, the school failed to notify the 
appropriate law enforcement officials, did not discipline the 
male student who perpetrated the assaults, and instead 
suspended Penelope and suggested the sexual contact was 
consensual, even though the school knew Penelope was legally 
incapable of consenting. 11 8 
112. !d. 
llil. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 186 F.3d 12::38 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
111. !d. at 1213. 
115. !d. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. at 1211. 
118. !d. 
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As this case occurred in the same timeframe as the Davis 
case, the Tenth Circuit waited for the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Davis before making its own decision. 119 In relying on Davis, 
the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Murrell that where school 
officials had actual knowledge of repeated sexual assault by a 
student and yet decided to remain idle, this was deliberate 
indifference. 12° Furthermore, this "deliberate indifference to 
her claims totally deprived [Penelope] of [her] educational 
benefits." 121 In this case, all prongs of the Davis Test were met, 
and the school was held liable. 
However, the Murrell court felt that the Davis decision "did 
not expressly set out the standard for determining when a 
school board has sufficient notice that harassment is taking 
place." 122 So, the Tenth Circuit looked to a Seventh Circuit 
Title IX decision, Doe v. University of Illinois, which held that a 
school district is liable if "a school official who had actual 
knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school board with 
the duty to supervise the [harasser] and the power to take 
action that would end such abuse and failed to do so." 123 The 
Murrell court went on to explain that in addition to actual 
knowledge of the harassment, a school official must also 
possess the "requisite control over the situation" in order to 
invoke Title IX liability through the Davis standard. 124 The 
court, in addressing this "requisite control" standard and in 
acknowledging the fine line of Title IX claims, discussed the 
impossibility of circumscribing all possible fact scenarios into 
one cut and dry "actual knowledge accompanied by deliberate 
indifference" standard: 
We decline simply to name job titles that would or would not 
adequately satisfy this requirement. "[S]chool districts 
contain a number of layers below the school board: 
superintendents, principals, vice-principals, and teachers and 
coaches, not to mention specialized counselors such as Title 
IX coordinators. Different school districts may assign 
different duties to these positions or even reject the 
traditional hierarchical structure altogether." Rosa H., 106 
119. !d. at 1215. 
120. Jd. at 1217. 
121. !d. at 1249. 
122. !d. at 1247. 
123. Jd. (citing Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 1:-38 F.::ld 65:!, 668 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
124. Td. at 1216. 
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F.3d at 660. Because officials' roles vary among school 
districts, deciding who exercises substantial control for the 
purposes of Title IX liability is necessarily a fact-based 
inquiry. Davis makes clear, however, that a school official 
who has the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps by 
measures such as transferring the harassing student to a 
different class, suspending him, curtailing his privileges, or 
providing additional supervisiOn, would meet this 
definition. 125 
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The court reasoned that a school district is liable where it 
"has made a conscious decision to permit sex discrimination in 
its programs, and precludes liability where the school district 
could not have remedied the harassment because it had no 
knowledge thereof or had no authority to respond to the 
harassment." 126 This limits liability to "circumstances wherein 
the recipient exercises substantial control over both the 
harasser and the context in which the known harassment 
occurs." 127 The Murrell court went on to quote from Davis, 
stating that the school principal's "response to the harassment 
or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances." 128 
B. Special Education Students as Perpetrators of Peer Sexual 
Harassment 
Special education students as targets of peer sexual 
harassment is only one side of the coin. Special Education 
students are sometimes the perpetrators as well. In a 2008 
survey of Utah special education teachers, 92% reported 
observations of peer sexual harassment incidents involving 
students with disabilities, with an 88% observation rate of 
situations where the disabled students was the perpetrator, 
and an 84% observation rate of those students as the target. 129 
With so many special education students prone to be the 
perpetrator, and not just the target, school administrators and 
teachers should take care not to lightly dismiss these types of 
125. !d. at 1217 (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 618, 660 
(5th Cir. 1997)). 
126. !d. at 1216. 
127. !d. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)). 
128. !d. at 1218 (citing Davis 526 U.S. at 618). 
129. Young, supra note 9, at 213-21 (where 250 Utah special education teachers 
were surveyed, with 129 responding to the survey). 
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harassment incidents without further investigation. Take, for 
the example, the case of Jones v. Indiana Area School District 
in 2005, where school officials with sufficient control had actual 
knowledge of ongoing harassment by a special education 
student against another student. 130 
As a student in the Indiana Area School District, Rachel 
Jones was assigned alphabetically to the same home room as 
special education student John Doe, a mentally retarded 
student who suffered from Sturge-Weber Syndrome. 131 Rachel's 
mother, Nancy Jones, was employed as a vision specialist in 
her daughter's school district by an agency that contracted with 
several school districts within the area to provide educational 
services. 132 At first Doe harassed Rachel by sending her notes 
and drawings expressing his desire to be her girlfriend. 133 
Rachel reported this behavior to her homeroom teacher in the 
eighth and ninth grades, and Rachel's mother also reported 
this behavior to Rachel's guidance counselor. 134 At this time 
Doe had an IEP with a behavior plan, but no services were 
provided to help him with deal with this type of harassing 
behavior, and no mention was made of Rachel's reports in his 
behavior plan. 135 In tenth grade Doe's harassing behavior 
increased and Rachel's mother had continuous and ongoing 
conversations with Doe's special education teacher about this 
unwanted affection and attention towards Rachel. 136 In 
eleventh grade Doe began to stalk Rachel, waiting for her at 
her locker, walking her to class, waiting for her at her car after 
school, etc. 137 Rachel enlisted the help of her biology teacher, 
who made efforts to keep an eye on Rachel in the hallways for 
the next two years, and who also passed along these concerns 
to the administration. 138 
In the spring of her eleventh grade year, Rachel and her 
mother met with the vice principal of the school to discuss 
further concerns about Doe stalking Rachel, and about rumors 
130. Jones v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628 (W.D. Penn. 2005). 
131. Jd. at 634. 
132. Id. 
1:33. I d. 
131. Id. 
135. ld. 
136. ld. 
137. ld. 
1:38. I d. 
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of Doe and his friends wanting to beat up Rachel. 139 The vice 
principal told Doe that he could not be friends with Rachel 
anymore, thinking this would alleviate the problem, but 
subsequent reports proved otherwise and the vice principal 
even went so far as to hold a meeting with Doe's parents that 
spring. 140 Also that spring, in an IEP conference for Doe, IEP 
team members reported "no" when asked if Doe exhibits 
"behaviors that impede his leHrning or that of others." 141 In the 
fall of Rachel's senior year, Doe continued to stalk her and even 
tried to force himself into her car located on school grounds in 
the parking lot. 142 The vice principal continued to assure 
Rachel and her mother that they would talk to Doe, but his 
behavior did not change. A few months later Doe physically 
blocked Rachel in the weight room for half an hour. 143 At this 
point, Rachel's mother involved the State Police, who advised 
the school that Rachel should have someone with her at all 
times. 144 The school eventually provided a female aid to "tail" 
Doe around the school, even though Doe's mother stated that a 
male aid was needed. 145 The school also arranged for Doe to be 
transported directly from his work assignment to his home and 
the district advised its teachers and coaches that Doe should 
not have any contact with Rachel. 146 The district also modified 
Doe's IEP behavior plan to specifically include his problem with 
Rachel for the first time since his harassment of Rachel began, 
five years earlier. 147 
Rachel's mother made repeated attempts to engage school 
officials in stopping Doe's harassment, including addressing 
the school board, and sending a complaint to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education. 14ll The school board did instruct a 
district employee to look into the possibility of transferring Doe 
to a neighboring district, but the request was denied when that 
employee told the neighboring district about Doe's harassment 
1:19. !d. at 6:~5-a6. 
110. /d. at 636. 
111. /d. 
142. /d. 
1~:3. !d. 
1~~- /d. at 6:l7. 
115. ld. 
146. /d. 
117. /d. at 6c18. 
1~8. ld. 
724 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2011 
problems. 149 The district also offered Rachel the option of 
switching to homebound instruction, which she did not accept, 
as her current involvement in AP classes helped her candidacy 
for college entrance. 150 After Rachel's mother Nancy became so 
involved in advocating for Rachel, the superintendent sent a 
request to Nancy's boss asking her to be transferred to another 
district to which Nancy responded with a grievance claiming 
the transfer was discriminatory and lacked just cause, but her 
grievance was eventually denied by a collective bargaining 
agreement arbitrator. 151 
Rachel and her mother subsequently filed suit in district 
court alleging, among other claims, that the school district 
violated Rachel's Title IX rights. 152 While the other counts were 
dismissed, the court found that there was a genuine issue as to 
material facts in determining if the school district was 
"deliberately indifferent" under the Davis standard. 153 
At first glance, a school official might have dismissed Doe's 
behavior as harmless, because "he didn't know any better." 
However, it was enough for the court to find that his behavior 
had the potential to substantively interfere with another 
student's educational opportunities. It could be that Doe is like 
many other students with disabilities, who have "difficulty 
understanding how others perceive their behavior and may 
lack the awareness to detect obvious social cues." 154 Students 
in these types of situations are often disregarded as a threat of 
liability for the school as "sexual harassment remains an 
almost invisible issue for special education." 155 Regardless of 
the reason or motive for the harassment, responses by school 
officials to peer sexual harassment "require sensitivity to both 
the target and the perpetrator" as "[a]ll students have a right 
to attend school without fear of harassment." 156 
149. Jd. at 638-39. 
150. !d. at 639. 
151. Jd. at 641. 
152. Jd. 
153. Id. at 612. 
154. Young, supra note 9, at 210. 
155. Jd. at 210. 
156. !d. at 219. 
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C. Peer Harassment Where Both Parties are Disabled 
Students 
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Whether or not a school district exercised "deliberate 
indifference" in the face of student-on-student sexual 
harassment can sometimes be a very close call, especially 
where both students are developmentally delayed. In Counts v. 
Clackamas, a developmentally delayed female student was 
allegedly raped by her classmate, another developmentally 
delayed male student, and her parents filed a Title IX suit 
against the school district. 157 The parents contend that the 
school district failed to take adequate measures in preventing a 
subsequent sexual assault after a prior incidence occurred with 
this same male student assaulting another female student the 
previous year. 158 The district court ultimately found that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the 
district was deliberately indifferent to the rights of a disabled 
student. 159 
In Counts, all three students were classmates in a "life 
skills" class for special education students when the first 
incident of sexual assault occurred between the male student 
and one of the female classmates in the bathroom during 
"recycling time." 160 Even though the specific facts of the 
incident never became entirely clear and the police 
investigation was inconclusive, the district risk manager 
investigating the case admitted that "insufficient supervision 
on the part of our staff was clearly an issue that might have 
allowed this to have occurred." 161 The court found that at this 
point in the series of events "at a minimum, the District was 
put on notice that it had potential problems with supervision" 
of its developmentally delayed students. 162 As a result of this 
first incident, the district developed a plan that would have 
placed this particular male student under a high level of 
supervision where he would be visually observed at all 
157. G.C. ex rel. Counts v. N. Clackamas Sch. Dist., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Or. 
2009). 
158. !d. at 1229. 
159. !d. at 1226. 
160. !d. at 12:l0~81. 
161. !d. at 12il9 (stated in a November 15, 2004 memo by the district risk manager 
in a "lengthy conversation" he had with a detective who worked on the KW case). 
162. !d. 
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times. 163 However, whether or not this constant supervision 
actually occurred is disputed, and the next spring the plaintiff 
female student of this case alleged that this same boy raped 
her in the bathroom after sneaking past his teacher. 164 
In analyzing this case, the district court's ruling did not 
turn on one significant fact alone, but rather a compilation of 
many different factors, such as the district's failure to "train its 
administrators and teachers in the proper handling and 
investigation of child abuse reports," failure to reveal in the 
first investigation relevant records indicating this male student 
was "sexually curious" in the past, failure to give weight to 
knowledge that it had of an inappropriate touching incident on 
the bus, and to the findings of the school psychologist 
predicting this student was likely to engage in sexual 
advances. 165 While school liability is not founded upon any one 
single factor, school officials should still be aware of the weight 
of each factor. For example, while "[t]he lack of training by 
itself does not establish deliberate indifference to plaintiffs 
rights," the court still found that "the District's child abuse 
reporting and investigation training policies, or lack thereof, 
[were] relevant in assessing how the District handled [the 
student]'s allegation." 166 
Although the district judge admits this was a "close case," 
the court was careful in its analysis and looked to circuit court 
cases that closely followed Davis to guide its own decision. 167 
The Counts court noted a First Circuit case, Fitzgerald u. 
Barnstable School Community, where the court ruled that 
"Title IX does not require educational institutions to take 
heroic measures, to perform flawless investigations, to craft 
perfect solutions, or adopt strategies advocated by parents." 168 
Additionally, the Counts court noted that simply claiming that 
a school district could have or should have done more "is 
insufficient to establish deliberate indifference." 169 
163. ld. 
161. ld. at 1235 n.1. 
165. Id. at 1240-41 ("the school psychologist noted that in an unstructured setting, 
the likelihood of sexual advances hy A Y with his girlfriend, was a •;y or a '4' on a low to 
high scale of 1 to 6"). 
166. ld. at 1239. 
167. Id.at1241. 
168. Jd. (citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 501 F.:-ld 165 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
169. I d. (citing Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 188 F.cld 67, 7:l (1st Cir. 2007)). 
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Contrast Counts with Ings-Ray v. School District of 
Philadelphia where a district court granted the school district's 
motion for summary judgment in response to a student-on-
student Title IX harassment claim after finding the district 
"clearly did not act with deliberate indifference in responding 
to plaintiff's allegations." 170 Similar to Counts, this case 
involved a mentally disabled male student sexually assaulting 
a disabled female classmate. However, in this case the male 
student simply "touched plaintiff's behind while both students 
were traveling on a school bus." 171 In response to this report, 
the school immediately suspended the male student for three 
days, transferred him out of the plaintiff's classes, and 
arranged for supervision to occur in homeroom and the 
hallways. 172 Additionally, the school arranged for a police 
officer and a special interest group to present a program on 
inappropriate touching to the entire student body. 173 While 
these specific actions were tailored to the facts of the case, the 
Ings-Ray case is an example of a school that successfully 
shielded itself from Title IX liability. 
D. Responding to Inappropriate Behavior by Students with 
Disabilities 
When a sexual harassment incident occurs between two 
students, school administrators can respond with any number 
of disciplinary measures. In fact, the Davis standard does not 
mandate one specific response, but rather articulates a 
standard that the school "must merely respond to known peer 
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."174 
Additionally, the Davis court disagreed with the respondent's 
demand that "nothing short of expulsion of every student 
accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect 
school systems form liability or damages." 175 Furthermore, 
when it comes to suspension and expulsion of students with 
disabilities, school administrators are bound to the procedural 
protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
170. lngs-Ray v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 02-CV-3615, 103 LRP 19220, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 30, 2003). 
171. /d. at *2. 
172. ld. 
17il. /d. 
174. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 619 (1999). 
175. /d. at 618 (citing Brief for Respondents at 16). 
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(hereinafter "IDEA"), 176 and must act accordingly, even to 
incidents involving the sexual harassment of another student. 
Under IDEA, when a student misbehaves and the 
disciplinary measure would result in a change of placement 
(including suspension, expulsion, or even a change to a 
different classroom), the school must hold a "manifestation 
determination" within ten days to determine "if the conduct in 
question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial 
relationship to, the child's disability." 177 If it is determined that 
the behavior is not a manifestation of the disability, then in a 
case of sexual harassment (or any other misconduct), the school 
may discipline the perpetrator as it would a student without a 
disability. 178 However, if it is determined that the behavior is 
connected to the disability, the school administration, working 
in conjunction with teachers and parents, will come up with a 
"behavioral intervention plan" (BIP) to address this 
misconduct. 179 Under special circumstances involving weapons, 
drug possession, or serious bodily injury of another student, a 
school "may remove a student to an interim alternative 
educational setting for not more than 45 school days without 
regard to whether the behavior is determined to be a 
manifestation of the child's disability." 1so In applying this 
"special circumstances" rule to cases of severe sexual 
harassment, "[a] critic could argue the sense of requiring such 
a process for students who have already committed criminal 
behavior such as weapon or drug offenses, or violent sexual 
assault." 181 However, for most sexual harassment incidents of a 
lesser severity, the "stay put" provision, given by the Supreme 
Court in 1988 in Honig u. Doe, requires that the disabled 
student remain in his or her current educational placement 
and continue to receive the education services that his or her 
IEP calls for, until a determination is made. 182 
176. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S. C.§§ 1100-1150 (2005). 
177. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Procedural Safeguards, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1115(k)(1)(E) (2011). 
178. !d.§ 1115(k)(l). 
179. !d. 
180. !d. § 1115(k)(l)(G). 
181. Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple as ABC: Disciplining Children with 
Disabilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 12 Awz. L. H"v. 77 n.151 (2000) 
(commenting on IDEA, 20 U.S. C. § 1115(k)(l)). 
182. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. :105 (1988). 
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In summary, while a school cannot ignore incidents of 
sexual harassment where the perpetrator is a student with a 
disability, a school is not required to suspend or expel the 
perpetrator if the disability played a role in the misconduct. 
Rather, to the extent that a school can "offer students an 
alternative educational setting in lieu of, rather than as a 
consequence of, suspension or expulsion, the district can both 
avoid the cost of individualized educational services and reach 
students who may be heading for trouble before they are in 
trouble." 183 However, when making decisions about placement 
of the perpetrator, school officials should keep in mind the 
rights of the plaintiff, especially if he or she is severely 
disabled, as many disabled students live in fear of repeat 
harassment, and in terror of having to face their perpetrator on 
a daily basis in what should be a safe school environment. 
E. Notice and Actual Knowledge Under the Davis Standard 
While Davis was monumental in establishing liability for 
schools in peer harassment cases, it gives little guidance for 
determining when a school district has crossed that line into 
the liability arena. Prior to Davis, the standard for notice was 
not as strict, stating "if [a] school district has constructive 
notice of severe and repeated acts of sexual harassment by 
fellow students, that may form the basis of a [T]itle IX 
claim." 184 Then in 1998 the Supreme Court instituted the 
"actual notice" (also referred to as "actual knowledge") 
requirement in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School 
District by holding that a school cannot be liable for damages 
under Title IX "unless a school district official who at a 
minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the 
district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately 
indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct" 185 A year later, Davis 
extended this same standard to student-on-student 
harassment. Subsequent circuit court cases have shed light on 
this standard, clarifying what it means for a school district to 
18:3. Seligmann, supra note 181, at 113. 
184. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 617 (1999) (citing NAOMI 
GITTINS & JIM WALSH, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION COUNCIL OF SCHOOL 
ATTORNEYS, SEXUAL HA!{ASSMENT IN THE SCHOOLS: PREVENTING AND DEFENDING 
ACAINST CLAIMS 15 (1990)). 
185. Ge!JSer v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 521 U.S. 271 (1998). 
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have "actual notice" at a level that qualifies their subsequent 
action or inaction as "deliberately indifferent." 
In arriving at its decision, the Davis Court looked at the 
reasoning of a Seventh Circuit case decided in the prior year, 
Doe v. University of Illinois, where a high school girl and her 
parents made repeated complaints to school administration 
when the girl was sexually harassed by a group of male 
students, only to have the administration take "little or no 
meaningful action to punish the sexual harassment or to 
prevent further occurrences." 186 Additionally, some 
administrators told the girl that she was to blame for the 
harassment and that her allegations of harassment might 
injure the futures of the male students. 187 The campaign of 
harassment never ceased and eventually the girl's parents 
placed her in a private school. 188 In a suit brought by the girl's 
parents against the school district for a Title IX violation the 
court held that: 
[A] Title IX fund recipient may be held liable for its failure to 
take prompt, appropriate action in response to student-on-
student sexual harassment that takes place while the 
students are involved in school activities or otherwise under 
the supervision of school employees, provided the recipient's 
responsible officials actually knew that the harassment was 
taking place. 189 
The Seventh Circuit in this case went on to specify that a 
school district can be liable if "a school official who had actual 
knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school board with 
the duty to supervise the employee and the power to take 
action that would end such abuse and failed to do so." 190 In 
short, this case is imputing to the Davis standard the 
requirement that a school official has actual knowledge, actual 
notice, and the power to take action against the harassment. 
However, if the "actual notice" standard requires a student 
who has been the victim of sexual harassment to distinguish 
186. Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.:ld 65:i, 655 (7th Cir. 1998). 
187. ld. 
188. ld. 
189. ld. at 661. 
190. ld. at 668 (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 128 F.:ld 1014, 128 (7th Cir. 
1997), where the court adopted a requirement of actual knowledge for teacher-on-
student sexual harassment and rejected Title IX liability based on a "knew or should 
have known" standard). 
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between which school personnel constitute those with the 
"power to take action" and which employees do not, this could 
render the standard unmanageable. The Office for Civil Rights 
(hereinafter "OCR") under the United States Department of 
Education has said "young students may not understand those 
designations and may reasonably believe that an adult, such as 
a teacher or the school nurse, is a person they can and should 
tell about incidents of sexual harassment regardless of that 
person's formal status in the school administration." 191 The 
OCR has also articulated that forming an exhaustive list of 
those employees who carry this power would be inappropriate. 
Instead, the OCR provides guidance to schools listing factors, 
considerations, and specific examples of what to do in a certain 
factual scenarios. 192 Additionally, the OCR guidelines can help 
administrators distinguish between what is actual sexual 
harassment, and what is not. Recently, stories across the 
country have sprung up where a six-year-old boy will be 
suspended for kissing a girl on the cheek, or for other similar 
conduct. 193 The OCR guidance notes that this type of behavior 
would not be considered sexual harassment and goes on to say 
that "school personnel should consider the age and maturity of 
students when responding to allegations of sexual 
harassment." 194 
For students with disabilities, these considerations imbue 
an even greater sense of responsibility on school officials to be 
on the lookout for "actual notice" of peer sexual harassment 
taking place in the school setting. Students with 
"developmental delays may be perceived as 'easy targets' by 
other students and adults in the school community." 195 These 
students are considered easy prey for perpetrators, especially if 
they lack the ability to respond appropriately to a harassment 
situation. "Additionally, the individual may have difficulty 
avoiding future negative interactions with the perpetrator, 
191. U.S. DEPT. OF I<;IJUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HAW\SSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HAI{ASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, 0'1'HER STUDENTS, OR 
THIRD PARTIES (1997) [hereinafter OCR GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar00.html. 
192. !d. 
19:~. Associated Press, Sex-harass Suspension of 1st Grader Stirs Debate, 
MSNBC.COM (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11252421/ns/us_ncws-
education/. 
191. OCR GUIDELINES, supra note 191. 
195. Young, supra note 9, at 208. 
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creating an ongoing cycle of sexual harassment." 196 
Furthermore, if a student lacks the ability to verbally 
communicate, whether due to a hearing impairment, or a 
language barrier (also including those students for whom 
English is not their first language), the school needs to have 
some other avenue for students to report sexual harassment, or 
at least for school officials to become aware of any possible 
incidents of harassment against those students. Once aware, 
school officials should take immediate action that is not 
"clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." 197 
F. Implications for Same-Sex Harassment 
While Davis held that Title IX liability extends to student-
on-student harassment, it was silent on the issue of same-sex 
harassment. The Supreme Court gave this idea a starting point 
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. where the Court 
held that "sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII." 198 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has ruled in another Title VII workplace 
discrimination case that where harassment is based on failure 
to live up to stereotypical gender norms, it can be actionable 
under Title VII, despite the harasser being void of any sexual 
desire toward the victim. 199 However, the Supreme Court has 
yet to rule on the specific claim of same-sex sexual harassment 
under Title IX, although many lower federal courts and state 
courts have addressed this issue. 
In Patterson, the Sixth Circuit decision outlined in the first 
portion of this article, the boy DP was verbally harassed by 
other males on a frequent basis, with the harassment 
escalating to an incident of sexual assault in the locker room.200 
The Sixth Circuit found there to be a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the "deliberate indifference" of school officials in their 
response to the harassment and remanded the case back to the 
federal district court, the Eastern District of Michigan. The 
district court subsequently found that the legal standard for 
sexual harassment under Title IX was not met and held that 
196. Jd. at 210. 
197. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. lld. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). 
198. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
199. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
200. Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 488, 4:l9-43 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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the school district was not deliberately indifferent.201 Rather, 
the district court found that the harassment directed at DP 
was "typical of middle school and high school behavior."202 The 
court cited the Supreme Court's Oncale Title VII decision by 
stating: "Whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of 
actionable harassment thus 'depends on a constellation of 
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships."'203 The court went on to explain that name-
calling, even when targeted at gender differences, can never 
rise to the level of the Davis standard, which demands that the 
harassment be so "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive 
it denies its victims the equal access to education that Title IX 
is designed to protect."204 
However, in exploring the boundaries of a Title IX claim on 
the basis of same-sex sexual harassment, it is argued that 
"such claims are equally viable under Title IX as they are 
under Title VII."205 However, most of the claims involving 
same-sex harassment that appear today will involve sexual 
assault or abuse more often than they will involve verbal or 
mild physical harassment "based on the failure of a student to 
live up to stereotypical gender expectations."206 At the circuit 
court level, a Title IX same-sex harassment claim has been 
recognized where a male teacher molested several male 
students.207 At the federal district court level a Title IX claim 
was allowed to proceed where "a male student who advocated 
gay rights was physically and verbally abused by fellow male 
classmates based on perceived homosexuality."208 Another 
district level Title IX case went forward involving the assault 
and battery of a middle school student by his male classmate 
201. Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., No. 05-714~:39, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 
2010). 
202. /d. at *9. 
20:l. !d. (citing Oncale, 52:l U.S. at 82). 
201. /d. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651-52 (1999)). 
205. Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroads of Title IX and a New "IDEA": Why 
!Jullyin,; Need Not be "A Normal Part of Growing Up" for Special Education Children, 
12 DUKE,J. GENIJEI{L. & POL'Y 1,12 (2005). 
206. !d. at 12. 
207. Jd. at 12 n.71 (citing Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 
1998)). 
208. /d. at 13 n.78 (citing Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 869 
(N.D. Ohio 200~:3)). 
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where the harassment was based on his perceived 
homosexuality. 209 
As for cases involving special education students and same-
sex harassment, there are very few. In addition to Patterson, 
which was a circuit case, there is one district court decision 
involving a Title IX claim for same-sex sexual harassment of a 
student with disabilities which also fails to live up to the Davis 
standard in the eyes of the court.210 In this case, a twelve-year 
old mildly retarded boy claims that his male classmate, who is 
also mentally disabled, sexually assaulted him in the restroom 
at school by performing anal sex on him.211 Upon seeing the 
two boys alone in the bathroom acting suspiciously, the teacher 
immediately took the two students to the assistant principal. 
However, school officials did not contact the parents and did 
not launch an investigation until after the parents became 
aware of the situation.212 However, during this time, the 
teacher made efforts to keep the two students separated in the 
classroom. Once the investigation began, however, the 
principal interviewed employees and students, held a meeting 
with the parents, contacted Child Protective Services and the 
police, and transferred the perpetrator to another school. 213 
The court found that the responses of the school and the 
principal were not "clearly unreasonable . . . in light of the 
known circumstances"214 and stated that even if the school 
"could have taken swifter and more appropriate action, there is 
no legal requirement of perfection."215 The allegation of sexual 
assault, even if proven true, was not sufficient to hold the 
school liable, as the school responded reasonably to the 
allegation. Furthermore, there were "no other incidents of 
gender-related harassment alleged in any of Plaintiffs' 
filings."216 However, the court did find evidence of "prior 
bullying, teasing, and name-calling"217 but relied on the Davis 
209. !d. at 5 n.:30 (citing Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 
(N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
210. Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex. 2001). 
211. !d. at 691. 
212. !d. 
21;). !d. 
211. ld. at 69;) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. I3d. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 618 
(1999)). 
215. Jd. at 694. 
216. Id. 
217. Jd. 
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standard to declare that "[d]amages are not available for 
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, 
however, even where these comments target differences in 
gender."218 In short, the district court seemed willing to 
acknowledge that same-sex sexual assault would be enough to 
find the school liable under Title IX in just the same way as 
opposite-sex harassment, but that verbal or mild physical 
harassment based on gender differences would not qualify for 
Title IX protection. However, in the former case, the school's 
actions would still have to rise to the level of deliberate 
indifference in order for the court to find liability in a same-sex 
sexual harassment claim. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Ever since the Supreme Court ruled in Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools219 that a private individual 
could sue for damages under Title IX, the number of cases 
claiming sexual harassment in the public schools have 
increased dramatically.220 With the addition of Gebser and 
Davis to the mix, lower federal courts have built up a 
"substantial body of sexual harassment law affecting school 
districts."221 For a school administrator just trying to get 
through the tasks of each day, this giant body of potential 
liability may feel like a dark cloud looming overhead. However, 
there is a ray of hope: a school need not purge its entire system 
of any potential future harassment incidents, nor must it carry 
out with perfection a plan to stop all teenage hormones. 
Rather, a school must simply "respond to known peer 
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."222 
With regards to special education students, however, school 
officials need to be aware of the unique challenges and barriers 
that may stand in the way of providing these students a safe 
environment, free from the fear and terror of sexual assault, 
especially for those students who have experienced sexual 
assault in the past. A lack of understanding of the needs of 
special education students is often the forerunner to situations 
218. !d. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 618). 
219. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
220. ALEXAN DE!{ & ALEXAN DEl{, supra note 5, at 537. 
221. !d. at 5:38. 
222. Davis, 526 U.S. at ()18. 
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where those students' rights are diminished, and in severe 
cases, trampled. School officials should also keep in mind that 
often the perpetrator in a peer harassment situation is a 
student with disabilities. When this occurs, school officials 
should take care to act in accordance with the provisions of 
IDEA and a student's own IEP. Case law, while not plentiful, 
does exist for harassment claims and can be a guide to school 
officials as they navigate the waters of Title IX liability. By 
working together with other administrators and school 
personnel, any school official can realize the success of 
providing a harassment-free environment for every student, 
regardless of that student's disability or limitations. 
Annette Thacker 
